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This paperexperimentally measuresthe‘social capital’ ofaltruism, trust
and reciprocity and empirically explores the impact of these norms on eco-
nomic well-being. Using an experimental design that distinguishes trust
and reciprocity from altruism, data were collected from individuals in a
random sample of South African communities. Analyzed at the commu-
nity level, these data suggest that while related, trust and reciprocity are
clearly di¤erent from altruism. Moreover, the relatively strong correlation
between trust and reciprocity indicates that communities are in a sort of
normative equilibrium, with trust strongest where reciprocity norms are
most active. Finally, analysis of household living standard data drawn
from these same communities shows that these norms have real economic
e¤ects on households’ well-being. The e¤ects of both altruism and trust
are signi…cantly positive in urban communities, whereas the e¤ects of these
same norms are weaker or negative in more traditional rural areas.
¤We thank the MacArthur Foundation for …nancial support. We also thank Jeanine An-
derson, Jim Andreoni, Abigail Barr, Jean-Paul Chavas, Adolfo Figueroa, Larry Samuelson and
seminar participants at Michigan State University and the University of Wisconsin for their
comments.1. Introduction
The growing literature that identi…es trust and norms as essential to economic
interactions would not have surprised Adam Smith. Similar to Smith in his The-
ory of Moral Sentiments, this literature underscores the importance of norms that
control the “self-regarding passions” and lead individuals to behave in a trustwor-
thy fashion. This literature uses trust to explain why some Italian regions have
better local governments than others (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993); why
some countries are better suited to develop large organizations (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996); why …nancial systems develop more easily
in some regions than in others (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2000); and, why
some countries grow faster than others (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Trust might
makecooperationpossiblewhile avoiding the cost associated withthe enforcement
of legal contracts (Putnam, 1995; Fukuyama, 1999). In less developed economies
where the cost of legality is high (de Soto, 1989), and where …nancial markets are
thin or missing, relations based on trust or informal enforcement mechanisms may
provide the only avenue of access to the credit and insurance. Con…rming this
conjecture, Narayan and Pritchard (1998) and other studies …nd that a greater
density of civic associations (which they interpret as an indicator of ‘social capital’
and trust) enhances households’ ability to generate a livelihood.
The goal of this paper is to directly measure and empirically explore the ef-
fects ofthe social capital of altruism, trust and reciprocity on economic well-being.
Sobel (2002) suggests that work on social capital that focusses on small group in-
teractions is more compelling than studies that try to link social capital measures
with national-level trends. Consistent with that suggestion, this paper relies on
datacollectedfrom individuals ina random sample of South African communities,
using an experimental economic design that isolates trust and reciprocity from al-
truism. Analyzed at the community level, these data suggest that while related,
trust and reciprocity are clearly di¤erent from altruism. Moreover, the relatively
strong correlation between trust and reciprocity indicates that communities are
in a sort of normative equilibrium, with trust strongest where reciprocity norms
are most active. Finally, econometric analysis of household living standard data
drawn from these same communities shows that these norms signi…cantly a¤ect
households’ material well-being. In urban areas, a ten percent increase in commu-
nity reciprocity norm is estimated to increase household per-capita expenditures
by seven percent, controlling for other household assets and income earning op-
portunities. In more traditional rural areas, the e¤ects of norms of altruism, trust
1and reciprocity norms are weaker or negative.
Trust and trustworthiness are complex concepts, and the recent literature con-
tains multiple meanings and measures of them. At a conceptual level, trustworthy
behavior sometimes appears as the stable equilibrium to a repeated game among
passionately self-regarding individuals (as in Ghosh and Ray, 1996). Trustwor-
thiness is also interpreted as an internalized moral norm that renders unthinkable
untrustworthy actions, e¤ectively removing them from the strategy set (Platteau,
2000).
At an empirical level, research on trust has either relied on associational den-
sity measures (e.g., number andstrength of civic associations), or on direct survey
questions that ask respondents to self-report trust and trustworthiness (e.g., re-
spondents are asked how much they trust family, neighbors, and government.;
how much they contribute to charities; how often they lend money to neighbors;
etc.). Neither approach is entirely satisfactory. Associational density measures
may con‡ate simple (incentive compatible) information sharingthat ‡ows through
networks (what Fafchamps and Minten, forthcoming, call social network capital)
with the operation of norms that stabilize time-sensitive exchanges. Self-reported
trust measures, which ask people to report on their own virtues and those of their
friends and neighbors have been criticized as suspect by Putnam (1995) and oth-
ers. Di¤erent respondents might also understand such questions di¤erently, or
they may respond di¤erently according to the identity of the interviewer. More
importantly, even if these questions do reveal information about the person, it is
di¢cult to understand what exactly we have uncovered. Finally, neither empir-
ical approach o¤ers any prospect of separating out the e¤ects of di¤erent norms
(e.g., altruistic sharing norms versus norms of reciprocity), despite the fact that
these di¤erent norms may have radically di¤erent economic impacts, as Platteau
(2000) argues.1
Experimental economic methods o¤er a potentially more appealing way to
measure behavioral norms. In recent papers, Camerer and Fehr (2001) advo-
cate the use of economic experiments to measure the relative importance of social
1Theoretical analyses that suggest that di¤erent norms have di¤erent e¤ects include studies
that show that …scal policy is neutral in the case of inter-generational altruism but not so if inter-
vivos transfers are explained by exchange or reciprocity motives (see Bernheim, Shleifer, and
Summers, 1985; Cox, 1987; Cox, Zekeriya, and Jimenez, 1998). Analogously, reciprocal behavior
in the workplace might explain unemployment, as suggested by Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and
Yellen (1990). What local institutions a community has could also depend on whether altruism
or reciprocity is prevalent therein. For instance, contracts might need to be incomplete in order
to let reciprocity intervene (Fehr and Gachter, 2000).
2norms, while Carpenter (2001) proposes the use economic experiments to mea-
sure social capital and trust. In prior work, experimental economists have used
dictator games–in which an individual is given an endowment of money that they
may either share with others or keep for themselves–to measure the strength of
other-regarding, or altruistic norms. Glaeser et al. (2000) propose an experimen-
tal measure of trust and trustworthiness using a “trust game.” The trust game
consists of two players, one endowed with money, thetrustor, and one without, the
trustee. The trustor decides whether to keep the money for herself, or whether
to ‘invest’ some or all of it by sending it to the trustee. Any money invested
generates a return (e.g., it is doubled or tripled.) The trustee, after receiving the
multiplied money, decides whether to keep the money, or whether to return some
to the trustor. A sel…sh trustor would send the trustee money only if she expects
the trustee to return more money than was sent. Since, without such trust, a
sel…sh trustor would be better o¤ by keeping all the money for herself, Glaeser et
al. consider the amount of money sent to the trustee as a measure of trust.
However, amounts invested in trust games do not necessarily isolate trust (nor
would amounts returned by trustees cleanly measure the strength of reciprocity
norms). Trust games reveal only how much purely sel…sh trustors trust—i.e.,
measuring trust with this trust game assumes that no other motives explain acts
of giving. But assuming that people are sel…sh (as trustors) and reciprocate (as
trustees) is asymmetric. Moreover, this assumption is certainly at odds with
the implicit notion that people trust because they are immersed in a normative
universe. People can return money in the trust game out of fairness or inequality
aversion rather than out of reciprocity. In the same manner, people can send
money away as a trustor out of altruism as well as trust.2
Building on these insights, this paper attempts to disentangle norms of altru-
ism, trust and reciprocity. Beyond its logical appeal, this decompositionof norms
is potentially useful because di¤erent norms may have distinct economic impacts.
This paper then tests whether or not these di¤erent norms really matter (and
matter di¤erently) in terms of in‡uencing people’s capacity to get ahead economi-
cally, as the work on social capital has suggested. This matching of experimental
data with real life data permits a deeper exploration of the meaning of norms, as
well as of the meaning of experimental measures.
Several prior studies have implemented experiments designed to distinguish
2Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and Sefton (1994), Eckel and Grossman (1996), and Andreoni
and Miller (2001) are among those who have shown that individuals will send money to others
in similar experimental situations out of respect for these norms.
3trust from altruism. Gneezy, Guth and Verboven (2000) analyze a modi…ed trust
gameinwhichtrustees’ capacity toreciprocateis subjected tovarious limits. They
…nd that trustors tend to send more money as constraint to the trustees’ ability
to reciprocate is relaxed. They infer from this result that amounts sent in the
trust game re‡ect in some measure trust rather than exclusively altruism. In an
approach related to that developed in this paper, Cox (2000) compares behavior
in trust and dictator games. His …nding that about 70% of the amount passed by
trustors and returned by trustees can be explained by distributional or altruistic
concerns rati…es our concern that amounts sent in trust games re‡ect altruism as
well as trust.3
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
experimentaldesign andshowshowtrust andtrustworthiness canbe confused with
altruism. We also show, in this section, how to use intra-personal comparisons
of play in di¤erent games to measure the altruistic component of trustors’ and
trustees’ decisions. Section3 describes the experimental procedures, while section
4 presents the basic experimental results, derives measures of trust and altruism
and tests for thepresenceofreciprocitynorms. Section5 looks at the relationships
between normative behavior and economic performance. We conclude in the last
section.
2. Altruism, Trust and Reciprocity
We denote as ‘purely sel…sh’ the following representation of the trustor’s decision
in the trust game described in the introduction above:
Max
xs;xo
u(xs + r(xo)) (2.1)
subject to
xs + pxo · B
t
p · 1
3Cox implemented several dictator games designed to duplicate elements of both trustor and
trustee decisions. One dictator game had a price of giving equal to a third, reproducing a trust
game in which the expectation of money being sent back is exactly equal to zero. A second
dictator game included endowment for the receiver, reproducing the choice that a trustee has
to make when he receives a positive amount of money, but e¤ectively removing any motive for
reciprocal behavior. Similarities between play in these dictator games with actual trustor and
trustee play are the basis for Cox’s conclusion that 70% of trust game behavior is the result of
distributional concerns.
4The trustor maximizes utility by allocating available funds between herself and
her partner. Here xs is the amount of money retained by the trustor, and xo is
the amount of money that the trustor gives to trustee. The cost of keeping a unit
of money is one, and the cost of passing one unit of money to the trustee is p.
There is no enforceable contract that guarantees that any of the money passed to
the trustee will be returned to the trustor. We assume that trustees returns funds
according to the response or reciprocation function, r(xo), and that this function
is deterministic and known by the trustor.4
Under the representation in (2.1), a sel…sh trustor will only give money to the
trustee if r(xo) > pxo for some xo. For a sel…sh trustor i, a measure of trust is the






as this reveals the minimum amount trustor i expects a trustee will return per
unit of money received from her.
However, ¾t
i is not a good measure of trust if the trustor’s preferences are not
strictly sel…sh (i.e., monotone in her own payo¤). More precisely, ¾t
i no longer
re‡ects expectations if trustors care about trustees, regardless of the possibility of
reciprocation. To permit the possibility of altruism, we modify problem (2.1) by
allowing utility to depend on own as well as other’s payo¤s. Formally, we rede…ne
the utility function as
u(xs + r(xo);xo ¡ r(xo)): (2.3)
Under this more general representation, an altruistic trustor who cares about the
trustee might select xo > 0 even if she expected no return from the trustee. Trust
measure (2.2) would in this circumstance confound trust with altruism.
2.1. Trust Controlling for Altruism
In order to isolate the impact of trust on behavior, it would be useful to observe
trustor behavior when no reciprocity is expected, i.e., when the trustor assumes
that r(xo) = 0. Denote the budget share that trustor i would send conditional on
4Experimenters and experimental subjects alike rarely observe the preferences behind recip-
rocal actions. A more general approach would represent reciprocity by a function r(xo;µ), where
µ is a preference parameter over which trustor can place a prior probability distribution p(µ).
This brings new elements to the analysis, that while potentially crucial, would take us far a…eld.
We exclude a detailed discussion of behavior under risk in the present version of the paper. But
see Barr (2001) for a …rst take onto these issues.
5an expectation of zero return as e ¾
t
i. Using this conditional, or zero expectation





i ¡ e ¾
t
i: (2.4)
Note that measure (2.4) is based on an intra-personal comparison and requires
that we observe the behavior of person i under multiple scenarios. Also note that
this measure presumes that the underlying preferences between her own material
well-being and that of the other is not in‡uenced by the game being played.5
While conceptually appealing, measure (2.4) requires that the trust game be
played under the counterfactual expectation of zero-reciprocity so that e ¾
t
i can be
measured. We propose here to use a dictator game to approximate the situation
in which trustors expect no reciprocity, and so estimate the degree of altruism
on the part of trustors.6 The dictator game is a simple allocation exercise that
abstracts from the strategic considerations of the trust game (Forsythe et al. 1995;
Andreoni and Miller, 2002). The dictator game consists of two players, a dictator
and a receiver. The dictator is endowed with an initial endowment that she can
either keep for herself, or allocate to the receiver at a price of giving, p. The
receiver has to accept any decision made by the dictator.7
5It is possible that when playing the trustor role the individual adopts a less or more self-
regarding attitude than they adopt when playing the dictator role. For example, if people
are less self-regarding in the trust game (perhaps because they feel an obligation to help realize
social gains), then (2.4) will overstate trust understood as a measure of expected returns. While
this latter observation is interesting, if we are interested in characterizing norms that enhance
a community’s ability to take advantage of gains such as those presented by the trust game, it
may matter little whether additional amounts sent re‡ect trust that the gains will be shared or
simply a duty to help others realize potential gains.
6Some studies dispute whether amounts sent in dictator games capture altruism at all or
whether they re‡ect of the lack of experimental controls. Ho¤man, McCabe, Sachat, and Smith
(1994) show that an increase anonymity produces a sharp decline in the amount shared by
dicators. Eckel and Grossman (1996) have shown that a likely reason for adecline in contribution
is that double-blind treatments eliminate any social context that could justify sharing, not the
lack of a desire to share. Research also shows that dictator games are very sensitive to the
subject population. Carpenter et al. (2001) …nd that a group of workers shared on average half
of their endowment, in contrast with one-third typically found in studies of university students.
Our own research points out to the same fact, on average, people shared forty percent of their
endowments.
7Since the maximum amount of money that the receiver can return is always zero, the
dictator game is equivalent to a trust game in which no reciprocity is expected. There is a
caveat, however, trustors could evaluate decisions based not only on trustee’s choices but also
on trustee’s available choices (Sen, 1996; Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 1999; Rabin and




u(zs + r(zo);zo¡ r(zo)) (2.5)
subject to : (2.6)
r(zo) = 0




i the budget share that dictator (or restricted trustor) i allocates to
the receiver, i.e., ¾d
i ´ pzo=Bd. Since zo itself depends on p and Bd, it follows
that ¾d depends on p and Bd. Therefore, if the price of giving, p, and money
available to the trustor, Bd, are the same in the dictator game as in the trust
game (equation 2.1), ¾d
i would directly indicate how much a trustor gives to a
trustee out of altruism alone, e ¾
t





This measure indicates that if we are uncertain of subjects’ underlying preferences,
the measurement of trust would require us to observe individuals choices in these
two games.
As explained in section 3 below, the experimental evidence collected for dic-
tator and trust games assumed di¤erent prices of giving and di¤erent budget
constraints. In the dictator game, participants had a budget of 16 Rand (or
approximately $2) and faced a price of giving of p = 1. The budget for the trust
game was 10 Rand and the price of giving was p =
1
3. While the modest ab-
solute di¤erence in the budgets makes it unlikely that di¤erent income elasticities
would in‡uence amounts sent in the two game, the change in the price of giving
is potentially more in‡uential.
Figure 2.1 shows the familiar tangency conditions for the two games. When
p = 1, the budget constraint is steeper, re‡ecting the higher price of giving. In
general, the share of the budget sent away (¾d) as the price of giving changes will
depend on the elasticity of substitution between payment to oneself and payment
to other. The level curves in Figure 2.1 show the cases when the altruistic
Charness, 2000). Trustors would be more lenient with trustees that are not able to reciprocate
than with trustess that choose not to reciprocate. If this is the case, measures of altruism may
be biased upwards. In this paper, we abstract from this possibility.
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Figure 2.1: Altruism and the Price of Giving
preferences (2.3) can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function and a
Leontief utility function.8
For the Cobb-Douglas case a decrease in the price of giving money to the
other person induces a substitution towards the other’s own payo¤, decreasing
the ratio zs=zo. But, since the elasticity of substitution equals one, the share of
the budget sent to the trustee would remain constant. For the Leontief utility
function, with zero elasticity of substitution between zs and zo, the ratio zs=zo
would remain constant, while the budget or expenditure share allocated to the
other person would fall. In the extreme case of in…nite elasticity of substitution
(linear indi¤erence curves) the entire budget would be allocated either to zs or zo.
8The Leontief utility function represents an extreme case of inequality aversion (Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
8In the face of a changing price of giving, the pure altruism counterfactual
trust share, e ¾
t
i, can be therefore only be identi…ed under an assumption about the
elasticity of substitution, denoted here as ½. To denote the dependence of this
measure on both play in the dictator game and the elasticity of substitution, we
denote theexpected pure altruism trust share as b e ¾
t
(¾d
ij½). Figure 2.2displays b e ¾
t
as
a function of amount sent in the dictator game for di¤ering values of ½, assuming
that the dictator game is played with a price of one and the trust game is played
with a price of one third. The solid forty-…ve degree line in the …gure illustrates
this relationship for the Cobb-Douglas case. In this case, any increase in the
budget share sent in the trust game over the dictator game would be interpreted
as a measure of trust purged of altruism.
If substitution were less elastic (e.g., if preferences were Leontief such that
½ = 0), then the relation between b e ¾
t
and ¾d would be as shown by the ‡atter,
dashed line in Figure 2.2. On the other hand, more elastic substitution (½ < ¡1)
would imply a steeper relationship than that implied by the Cobb-Douglas case.
The uppermost dotted line in Figure 2.2 illustrates the case where ½ = ¡3.
As Figure 2.2 makes clear, an altruism-free measure of trust calculated using
(2.4) is sensitive to assumptions about the elasticity of substitution. For example,
observed budget shares of40% in both the dictator andtrust games would imply a
trust measure of 25% under Leontief assumptions versus 0% under Cobb-Douglas
assumptions. The assumption of even more elastic substitution would, in this
hypothetical example, imply ‘negative trust.’
While it may seem intuitively appealing to assume that the elasticity of sub-
stitution is no greater than one, Andreoni and Miller (2001) provide experimental
evidence that the substitution is more elastic than the Cobb-Douglas case for a
subset of the undergraduate students that they studied. These authors estimate
that the actions of most of their experimental participants are consistent with one
of three preference pro…les. The behavior that would be predicted for each of
these preference pro…les in our dictator and counterfactual, zero reciprocity trust
games are marked on Figure 2.2. Under the ‘weak sel…sh’ pro…le (which Andreoni
and Miller estimate …ts 47% of their sample), a person would exhibit an elasticity
of substitution of -2.6 and dictator and trust shares of 5% and 31%, respectively.
The ‘weak Leontief’ pro…le (30% of the Andreoni and Miller sample) has an elas-
ticity of substitution of -0.7 and dictator and trustor shares of 39% and 32%.
Finally, the ‘weak perfect substitutes’ pro…le (½ = ¡2:6 and applying to 22% of
the population) predicts dictator and trust shares of 27% and 78%. While these
results indicate that some people substitute very elastically between themselves
90.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0



















































Weak Perfect Substitutes, r=-3
Figure 2.2: Expected Trustor Budget Shares under Pure Altruism Counterfactual
and others, the overall levels of altruism (as evidenced by the predicted dictator
shares) are modest among Andreoni and Miller’s undergraduate student popula-
tion. As we shall see in Section 4, altruism is much higher in the South African
participants in this study, making it di¢cult to infer preference parameters from
the Andreoni and Miller results.
2.2. Reciprocity Controlling for Altruism
This section considers the impact of altruism on the trustee’s decision that deter-
mine the return function, r(xo). We can formally represent the trustee’s decision




u(ys;(Bt ¡ pxo)+ yo) (2.8)
subject to
ys + yo · xo
As before, the subscript s indicates money kept by the decision-maker for himself,
whilethe subscript oindicates funds sent to the other person. This representation
of the decision-making problem makes clear that the trustee’s budget constraint
depends on the trustor’s prior decision, xo.. The terms in the utility function
recognize that the trustor may have kept some money for herself. However, prob-
lem (2.8) makes no reference to whether u(¢) is shaped by altruistic motives or
reciprocity norms.
A natural measure of the strength of reciprocity norms might seem to be the
budget share that the trustee returns to the trustor:
¾
r
j ´ r(xo)=xo: (2.9)
However, paralleling the prior section’s analysis of the impact of altruism on the
trustor’s decision, note that an altruistic trustee would be willing to return money
to the trustor independent of the fact that he may feel obligated to return some of
the money that was entrusted to him. While it may matter little to an individual
trustee whether money is returned out of altruism or out of reciprocity, the larger
economic impacts of these norms may be distinct. Analogous to prior section’s
analysis of trust, it is thus useful to de…nea purely altruisticcounterfactual budget
share, e ¾
r
j, that denotes the amount that the trustee would return to the trustor
when no reciprocity norms were involved. Using this share, a measure of the






j ¡ e ¾
r
j: (2.10)
Note that in environments of high altruism (e ¾
r
j ! 1), there is little scope for the
operation of reciprocity norms to further enhance returns to the trustee. Like
trust measure (2.4), (2.10) is also an intra-personal comparison measure.
To isolate the e¤ect of reciprocity and calculate measure (2.10), we would need
to observe the trustee’s behavior whenhis return decision is independent of, or not




u(ys;C + yo) (2.11)
subject to
ys + yo · B
ys;yo ¸ 0
where the trustee treats his own budget, B; as exogenous, and treats C as an
exogenous endowment enjoyed by the trustor. In contrast, problem (2.8) treats
these as endogenous–dependent on the trustee’s decisions–and hence capable of
inducing reciprocity norms. Formally, problem (2.11) is equivalent tothe dictator
decision (2.5) with a price of giving equal to one and an endowment C ¸ 0.
The solution to the counterfactual trustee problem (2.11) will in general not
be the same as the dictator game without endowments. If trustees care only
about …nal payo¤s, the fact that the trustor already has endowment C will re-
duce the amount of money that a trustee would otherwise allocate to the trustor.
Consequently, the share sent by a trustee in pure dictator game will overstate the
amount that trustee would return to the trustor under the counterfactual, zero
reciprocity scenario. However, the amount that would be sent can be straightfor-
wardly inferred from the pure dictator game under assumptions about the nature
of the utility function.
Assuming that trustee j’s preferences can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas
utility function of the form uj = (ys)1¡¾d
j(C + yo)¾d
j, and noting that B = xo and
C = (Bt ¡ px0), the solution to problem (2.11) will take the following form:9
y¤
o = maxf0;[¾d
j + (1¡ ¾d
j)p]xo ¡ (1¡ ¾d
j)Btg (2.12)
This pure altruism model of the trustee decision provides some interesting
intuition. The solid line in Figure 2.3 graphs (2.12) assuming that p = 0:33; Bt =
10 and ¾d
j = 0:38.10 First, as indicated by the intercept term (¡(1¡ ¾d
j)Bt) in
both(2.12) andthe…gure, altruistic trustees will feel less compelledto redistribute
to trustors the better endowed is the trustor. Second, the slope (¾d
j +(1¡ ¾d
j)p)
9Note that we use the dictator game budget share, ¾d
j, to parameterized this Cobb-Douglas
utility speci…cation, because an individual would send a budget share exactly equal to this utility
function parameter in the dictator game (2.5).
10The …rst two numbers are the parameters from the experimental design described below,
whiel the third re‡ects the median level of altruism in revealed in our study.









































Figure 2.3: Trustee Decision under Pure Altruism Counterfactual
is strictly greater than p (for p < 1), indicating that regardless of the trustee’s
altruism, he will always marginally repay more than the amount that the trustee
sent to the trustor (pxo). The more expensive it was for a trustor to share with
a trustee the kinder a trustee will be in returning funds at the margin.
Figure 2.3 displays the net e¤ect of these two forces that shape the purely
altruistic return decision. The dashed line in the …gure is a break-even level of
return, meaning the amount that if returned would leave the trustee no worse
than if she had kept the entire endowment for themselves. As can be seen for the
particular parameter values used to create the …gure, a trustee will only break-
even in sending funds to a purely altruistic trustee if she sends nearly the entire
budget to the trustee. In this sense, a purely altruistic trustee would not prove
to be especially trustworthy for a sel…sh trustor who wanted to recoup at least
13the amount of funds that she sent to the trustee.
Using equation(2.12), wecannowestimatethecounterfactual, zero-reciprocity







Inserting this estimate into expression (2.10) will yield the desired measure of
reciprocity, controlling for altruism.
3. Instrument and Field Procedures
As argued in the previous section, distinguishing trust and reciprocity from altru-
ism requires intra-personal comparisons of behavior under di¤erent games. All
experimental subjects were thus asked to play three games, one in the position of
a dictator, one in the position of a trustor, andone in the position of a trustee. All
data were collected in the province of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa. AnEnglish
version of the instructions can be found in the appendix. The experiments were
conducted in Zulu except in the Indian community of Chatsworth.
The experiments were implemented in 14 separate South African communi-
ties, seven urban and seven rural. These communities were originally selected
at random as part of the 1993 South African national living standards survey
(PSLSD 1994 details the survey methodology). For the living standards study,
approximately 20 households in each communities were randomly selected for an
in-depth interview. In the KwaZulu-Natal province, these same households were
re-interviewed in 1998. Forty percent of our experimental subjects were recruited
from the respondents to the living standard surveys, while the other sixty percent
were selected from other families in the same communities. Not more than one
participant per household was allowed. All the participants were of 18 years of
age or more and they were not told about experimental payments at the time of
recruitment.11 The average age of participants was 43 years old, with 2 out of
5 being male. 25% of the sample was at least 57 years of age and 25% was at
most 28 years of age. Participants had on average 6 years of education, with 25%
of them having at most 2 years of schooling and 25% of them having at least 10
years of schooling. On average, there were 20 subjects per session. Two sessions
were smaller (10 and 15 particiapants), and three sessions were larger (25 partici-
pants). All participants in each session belonged to the same neighborhood. On
11In two communities, people were aware that they would be paid a show-up fee for partici-
pating in the study.
14average, participants knew 30% of the people in the room by named. The average
payment to a participant in the experiment was 37 Rand (R37, or around $5),
which amounts to two-days wage in rural areas.
To play the dictator game, subjects were given 2 envelopes, one red and one
blue. The red envelope contained R16 in R2 coins, and the blue envelope was
empty.12 To pass some of the R16 to another person in the room, subjects were
instructed to pass it from the red envelope to the blue envelope. If a subject did
not want to share any money, they were told to leave the blue envelope empty.
To protect the privacy of subjects’ decisions, they were given a ‘privacy box,’
a cardboard box that prevented other people from seeing their manipulation of
envelopes. This ‘privacy box’ was used in all decisions thereafter. Before any
decision was made, a ‡ip chart was used to explain all the choices available to dic-
tators. After everyone had a chance to make a decision, envelopes were collected,13
shu-ed in front of everyone and assigned to new subjects. Careful attention was
paid to delivering envelopes in a way that no subjects were able to know their
content. The envelopes were not opened until the end of the session. Subjects
did not know their payo¤ from previous decisions prior to making the next.14
To play the trust game, subjects were given 3 envelopes, one red, one blue
and one green. The red envelope contained R10 in R2 coins, and the blue and
green envelope were empty and stapled together. To pass some of the R10 to
some other person in the room, subjects were instructed to pass it from the red
envelope to the blue envelope. Subjects were told that any money put in the
blue envelope was going to be tripled before being given to another subject. If
the receiver wanted to return any of the tripled money in the blue envelope, they
were instructed to use the green envelope to do so.15 If a subject wanted to pass
12An appendix available from the authors reports the instructions read to participants and
reproduces the various charts used to explain the game.
13Envelopes were collected in trails in order to minimize the contact that experimenters could
have with them, and so minimize in‡uencing subjects’ decisions.
14The standard dictator game endows only the dictator, but not the recepient with money. In
our game, everyone played both roles, raising the question as to why anyone would send money
to another player who was also playing the dictator role. The fact that players as dictators
did send signi…cant amounts of money suggests that they were responding to a general norm
that they should, and their neighbors would, share windfall gains with others in the community.
Since they expected to receive money, dictators had to send money in order to achieve a desired
payo¤ distribution. In their answers to a post-experiment questionnaire, many players further
indicated that they sent money in the dictator game because they believed that other players
needed the money more than they did.
15Envelopes were coded to keep track of the origin and destination of an envelope. The coding
15no money they were instructed to leave the blue envelope empty.16
Before any decision was made, a ‡ip chart was used to explain the choices
available to trustors.17 Moreover, subjects were asked to …ll out an empty chart
expressing how much money they thought would be returned to them had they
chosen to send each of the possible options shown there. After this exercise was
completed, subjects were asked to make a decision. Envelopes were collected,
money in them tripled and shu-ed in front of everyone to be assigned to new
subjects. But before the blue and green envelopes were delivered, new ‡ip charts
were used to explain the possibilities available to trustees. In addition, an empty
chart was given to everyone to be …lled with the amount of money they thought
they wouldhave returned had they received any of the amounts listed there. After
the charts were completed, subjects were given the blue and green envelopes with
the tripled money. They were told to pass to the green envelope any money
they wanted to return to the sender. Finally, decisions were recorded and the
green envelopes returned to the senders. A post-experiment questionnaire was
administered immediately after.
All subjects played as dictators …rst, then as trustors, and …nally as trustees.
This order of play could potentially bias results. Unfortunately, given therigors of
carrying out experiments in our South African …eld setting, we did not implement
alternative orders and designs that could allows us to determine the size of this
bias. The work of Harbaugh, Krause, and Liday (2000) with children suggests
that dictator game giving would have been lower if the dictator game had been
played after the trust game rather than before it. In an e¤ort to insulate trustor
decisions from play in the dictator game, our experimental protocol assures that
the information that trustors acquired when playing the dictator game was the
amount of money they themselves sent, not the amount of money that was sent to
them (i.e.., participants could only check their earnings after the full set of games
was completed). In addition, the price of giving and endowments were changed
from the dictator game to the trust game. While these changes raise substitution
elasticity issues as discussed earlier, we chose to make these changes to diminish
the analogies between one game and the other and diminish the impact of order
was such that nobody knew which code was associated to the envelope sent or received.
16We should mention that our design di¤ers with Berg et al. (1995) in that trustees act also as
trustors. This is, all subject played the role of trustors. This should diminish the distributional
concerns a trustor might have when deciding how much money to pass.
17An appendix that details the full experimental procedures and presents the visual aids used
in the experiments is available from the authors.
16e¤ects. However, in contrast to the trustor decision, it was impossible under
our protocol to fully insulate trustees from possible order e¤ects. In particular,
trustees were in a position to compare their own behavior as trustors with that of
the trustor who had sent them money.18
Our design included also an expectation elicitation stage. Eliciting beliefs
about other players actions might have an impact on the way the game is played.
Croson (2000) shows that in public good games and prisoner dilemma games peo-
ple tend to play more accordingly to theoretical predictions whenasked what they
think their opponent will do. Croson’s results imply that our measure of trust is
biased downwards, since trustors would think more carefully about the incentives
faced by trustees. Another potential problem of eliciting beliefs is that experi-
menters might lead subjects towards a particular way of playing the game. As
shown in the appendix, we were careful to present multiple examples to minimize
this possibility. Experimenters repeatedly stressed that decisions as well as re-
sponses were personal and that there was not a correct way to play the game.
They also refused questions that were not a clari…cation of the instructions.
A third issue is whether or not the method of payment could have biased
the results. Indeed, all subjects played all the roles making less salient the fact
that some subjects have assets while others lack them. However, post-experiment
questionnaires indicate that subject overwhelmingly regarded dictator’s decision
as an issue of equity. With regard to the trust game, subjects’ main reasons
explaining there actions divided evenly between issues of equity and reciprocity.
In addition, if subjects felt less the urgency to give as dictators, we would argue
that our measure of altruism is biased downwards. If so, our argument that issues
of altruism may be confused with trust and reciprocity would remain valid.
18It might be worried, for example, that a trustee who had sent little money as a trustor would
increase the amount sent as trustee if she discovered that her trustor had sent a much large share
than she had sent as a trustor. Empirical analysis of this commonsense proposition in our data
proves it to be false. The amount sent by a trustee actually decreases with the gap between
what that individual had sent as a trustor and what she had received as a trustee. In fact, if
we modify the reciprocity problem (2.8) to take into account that the trustee and trustor are
both known to be playing two roles, we …nd that the amount sent by the trustee will decrease
with the this gap, assuming that the trustee infers from the gap that others are more trusting
and generous than she is. The empirical evidence is thus consistent with a distributional story,
but not with a conditional cooperation story (nor with a social interaction story).
174. Experimental Evidence on Altruism, Trust and Reci-
procity
This section presents the results from the experimental design described above,
including the intra-personal comparison measures of trust and reciprocity. After
presenting basic descriptive and distributional information on experimental play,
we employ regression analysis of the key trustor and trustee decisions to show
that while altruism explains an important part of the observed behavior, other
norms are clearly operative as we can statistically reject the restrictions implied
by the pure altruism (zero reciprocity) models of trustor and trustee behavior.
Finally, this section concludes by showing that di¤erent norms are correlated
within communities in a way that is consistent with the notion that communities
are in a normative equilibrium. These …ndings increase our con…dence in our
measures and underwrite Section 5’s analysis of the impact of norms on economic
well-being within these communities.
4.1. Trust and Altruism
As reported in Table 4.1, mean (median) budget share sent by trustors in the
trust game was 53% (60%). Over 70% of the subjects sent between 40% and
60% of their budget to their trustees. At the aggregate level, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the share passed is equal to 50%. These results resemble
previous experiments using the trust game (Berg et al.,1995; Gneezy, Guth, and
Verboven, 2000). However, as Table 4.1 also shows, the average amount passed
variedacross the 13 communities where the experiments were conducted, with the
median amount sent ranging from 40% to 60%.
18Table 4.1
Altruism, Trust and Reciprocity Measures
Intra-personal
% Budget Shares Sent as: Comp Measures
N Dictator Trustor Trustee Trust Reciprocity
¾d ¾t ¾r ±
t ±
r
Full Sample Measures 283
Mean 42 53 38 11 13
Median 38 60 33 10 13
Medians by Community
Umlazi 19 25 40 33 23 25
Mpumalanga 15 25 40 33 3 33
Imbali 18 38 40 33 15 25
Mpakama 21 38 60 42 10 17
Kwamashu 19 38 60 33 23 11
Madadeni 21 38 40 33 5 15
Umzumbe 10 38 40 33 3 30
Kwabrush 17 38 60 50 18 21
Emkimdini 25 38 60 33 23 8
Buxeden 25 38 40 33 3 15
Chatsworth 20 50 60 39 1 6
Dundee 25 50 60 42 5 4
Okhlahlamba 23 50 40 33 0 8
Nkandla 25 50 60 42 10 8







However, these relatively robust shares sent in the trust game do not neces-
sarily re‡ect the existence of trust, understood as an expectation that trustees
will return funds to trustors. As discussed in Section 3 above, amounts sent in
the trust game may in part re‡ect the trustor’s altruistic regard for others rather
than purely an expectation of reciprocal behavior by the trustee. Indeed, levels
of altruism among this population appear quite high as measured by the dictator
game. Figure 4.1 duplicates Figure 2.2 except that we have projected onto it
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Figure 4.1: Behavior in Altruism and Trust Games
the actual budget share data points from the dictator and trust experiments.19
The average share sent in the dictator game, ¾d, is 42% (versus 53% in the trust
game). As can be appreciated from the …gure, nearly all experimental partici-
pants sent larger dictator budget shares than would be predicted by any of the
stylized Andreoni and Miller preference pro…les discussed in section 2.1.
Under the assumption that trustors have a unitary elasticity of substitution
between money for themselves andmoney for trustees, the 45-degree line in Figure
4.1 represents the predictedtrust game shares that would be sent by a trustee who
expected the trustee to return nothing to her. As can be appreciated visually,
most observations lie above the 45-degree line. Fully 70% of the subjects sent
19Since choices in both games are discrete, the graph shows “jittered” data, i.e., a random
component has been added in order to show graphically where the population is concentrated.
20away a larger share in the trust game than in the dictator game.20 Assuming
unitary elasticity of substitution, our intra-personal comparison trust measure
that controls for altruism, ±
t; averages 11% in the sample. We cannot reject the
hypothesis that this measure is greater than zero.
Before looking more closely at further evidence on the veracity of this trust
measure, it should be recalled that we would expect to see ¾t > ¾d even in the
absence of any trust if the elasticity of substitution were greater than one. The
zero expected return trust shares, e b ¾
t
, that would be predicted under the higher
substitution elasticity values identi…ed by Andreoni andMiller are again displayed
in Figure 4.1. As can be seen, under these higher substitution elasticity values,
trust would not only be nonexistent for most of the sample, but it would actually
have to be negative (i.e.., people give less when there is a possibility of return
than they do when there is no possibility of return). On these grounds, higher
substitution elasticities seem unlikely. Indeed, the only elasticity of substitution
assumption envelopes the data from below, and rules out ‘negative trust,’ is a
Leontief assumption. Further support for the notion that other norms beyond
altruism are driving the trust results comes from the observation that the corre-
lation between the share passed in the dictator game and the share passed in the
trust game is a modest 0.38. While we cannot incontrovertibly rule out higher or
lower substitution elasticity values, we will in the remainder of this analysis base
our trust measure on a Cobb-Douglas, unitary substitution elasticity assumption.
4.2. Reciprocity Norms and Altruism
The amount of money returned by trustees in the trust game is likely shaped by
altruism and reciprocity. From a sel…sh trustor’s point of view, however, this dis-
tinction is immaterial. A trustee is trustworthy if, for some trustor’s investment,
he returns as least as much as trustor original investment (i.e., yo > pxo). Under
our experimental design where p = 1
3, if the trustee returns less than one third,
20It might be worried that the di¤erence between trust and dictator shares is an artifact of
the relatively limited number of discrete choices available in the trust game where trustees had
to choose between sending 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100% to trustees. Options were more
varied in the dictator game where the available choices were 0%, 12.5%, 25%, etc. However,
while 36% of subjects passed 20 percentage points of their endowments more as trustor than as
dictators, only 8% of subjects sent 20 percentage points of their endowments more as dictators
than as trustors. This asymmetry indicates that the increase in the share sent in the trust games
cannot be explained solely by the experimental design.
21than a sel…sh trustor would have been better-o¤ by not sending any funds to the
trustee.
Figure 4.2 shows the data points from our experiments projected onto Figure
2.3 (thedatapoints have again beenjittered–see note 18). Most of the datapoints
lie above the break-even line, as 42% of the subjects chose to return more than 1
3,
while another 38% of subjects returned exactly a 1
3 budget share to the trustors.
Only 20% of trustees returned less to their trustor than she had originally sent,
and the average budget share returned was 38%. This result is quite remarkable
if we note that this intertemporal exchange is not incentive compatible. Trustees
have no incentive to return any money, since unless everyone returns nothing to
trustors, they remain anonymous.
While most trustees proved trustworthy, it is not clear whether this behav-
ior results from the already noted high levels of altruism, or whether it re‡ects
they are statistically di¤erent from each other as the hypothesis that they are
equal is rejected by Fisher’s exact test.21 Consistent with the notion that norms
other than altruism are operative is the modest 0.18 correlation between dictator
(altruism) shares and trustor shares.
A more precise decomposition of the trustee behavior into altruistic and reci-
procity components is possible using the prediction from the model of purely
altruistic behavior (2.9). Overall, 71% of subjects returned more as trustee than
the purely altruistic model of the trustee decision predicts according to equation
(2.9).22 This purely altruistic model predicts that 23% of subjects would have
returned a zero share as trustee based on their revealed levels of altruism and the
modest amounts sent to them by their trustors. (As can be seen in Figure 4.2,
a trustee with a median level of altruism would have returned zero to the trustor
anytime he received less than approximately 10 Rand.) In fact, only 3.5% of
trustees returned zero budget shares to their trustee. The measure of reciprocity
net of altruism measure, ±
r, has median and mean values of 13%. The correlation
between this measure and the trust net of altruism measure, ±t, is 0.43. The
21It is interesting to notice that the di¤erence in distributions is explained by the behavior
of trustees receiving less than R18 from trustors. Indeed, the distribution of budget shares
of dictators and trustees for the subsample of subjects receiving R18 or more as trustees is
statistically indistinguishable.
22We may again worry that this result is an artifact of the discrete choices avaialble to indi-
vidauls. However, 46% of the subjects returned, as trustees, a budget share that was at least
20 percentage points more than the altruistic model would have predicted. Only 10% of sub-
jects returned, as trustees, a budget share that was at least 20 percentage points less than the
altruistic model would have predicted.









































Figure 4.2: Trustee Decision
magnitude of this correlation, which exceeds that between the other pairs of norm
measures, lends further support to the idea that in there is an e¤ective norm of
reciprocity that shapes individual’s behavior in their roles as both trustees and
trustors.
4.3. Econometric Analysis of Trustor and Trustee Decisions
The descriptive analysis in the prior subsections suggests that while altruism is
high amongst participants in our experiments, there are norms of trust and reci-
procity that in‡uence behavior above and beyond what would be expected based
on altruism alone. This section solidi…es this insight with econometric analysis
23of the trustee and trustor decisions.23
Table 4.2 shows the regression estimates of the amount of money sent by par-
ticipants in their roles as trustors andtrustees. The regressions were estimated as
double-censored Tobits. For both trustor and trustee decisions, a pure altruism
model was speci…ed and estimated in conformity with the prior theoretical analy-
sis of these choices when trustees expect nothing in return and trustees are not
in‡uenced by reciprocity norms. For the trustor decision, the purely altruistic
model (under the assumption that the trustor has a unitary elasticity of substi-
tution between money kept for herself and money for the trustee) predicts that
the budget share sent to the trustee will equal the budget share the individual
sent as dictator in the dictator game. This prediction implies that for trustor j,
the intercept of the regression should be zero and that the coe¢cient on the term
¾d
jBt should be one. However, both of these predictions are easily rejected as the
intercept term is strongly and signi…cantly positive, while the point estimate of
the slope term is tightly estimated as 0.5.
The estimated positive intercept term indicates that even a completely non-
altruistic individual would send 3.5 Rand (35% of the trustee budget) to the
trustor. To further explore the forces that shape the trustor decision, the re-
gression model was augmented with other variables that might be expected to
in‡uence trust.24 While the inclusion of these variables does not change the
point estimates of the parameters of the altruism model, several interesting re-
sults do emerge. First, trustors sent signi…cantly more money as the number of
people they would expect to return more than a break-even amount increased,25
corroborating the role of trust beyond altruism in shaping trustors’ decisions.26
Second, an associational density measure (the number of civic and social groups
23We also investigated decisions taken in the dictator game. As in previous experimental
research (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001, Croson and Buchan,
2001), we found that women tend to be less sel…sh than men. We also see that amounts passed
in the dictator game were not a¤ected by the familiarity of the subject with other participants.
Market depedence as evidenced by food self-su¢ciency does not signi…cantly in‡uence altruism.
24Community …xed e¤ects were included but are not shown in Table 4.2.
25In the post-experiment questionnaires, participants were asked to report what percentage
of their co-participants would return at least 10 out of 30 Rand as trustees.
26These results also allay any fears that the results might be distorted by order e¤ects created
by the experimental design. Since subjects faced a sequences of three decisions, it is possible
that later decisions were in‡uenced by earlier ones for reasons other than altruism itself. For
instance, if learning took place, the results could overestimate the importance of trust. However,
the response of trustors’ decisions to reciprocity expectations increases con…dence that the trust
measures indeed re‡ect trust.
24Table 4.2
Double-Censored Tobit Estimates of Experimental Decisions
Money Sent to Other as:
Trustor, xo Trustee, yo
Altruism Augmented Altruism Augmented
Model Model Model Model
Altruism Variables
Constant 3.80 (.50)** 3.49 (1.02) ** 1.32 (1.05) -1.52 (1.65)
¾d
jBT 0.45 (.07)** 0.45 (.07) **
(1 ¡ ¾d
j)BT 0.22 (.10) ** 0.27 (.11) **
[¾d
j + (1¡ ¾d
j)p]xi
o 0.42 (.04) ** 0.44 (.05) **
Reciprocity Expectations
% who will Reciprocate 0.63 (.40) 0.89 (.58)
Returns if send R8, r(8) 0.58 (.24) ** 0.25 (.35)
Demographics
Age 0.01 (.01) -0.01 (.01)
1=Urban, 0 = Rural -0.20 (.61) -0.65 (.89)
1=Male, 0=Female 0.002 (.26) -0.27 (.38)
Years of Education 0.06 (.04) 0.002 (.06)
Social Assets
No. of Associations 0.09 (.07) 0.13 (.10)
% of Acquaintances -0.54 (.49) -0.06 (.74)
Economic Status
Per Capita Income -0.10 (.54) 0.42 (.79)
Food Self-Su¢ciency -0.39 (.16) ** 0.41 (.23) **
Community Fixed E¤ects
Coe¢cients not shown
Pseudo-R2 0.0571 0.0831 0.0844 0.097
Log-Likelihood -573.97 -518.81 -679.15 -623.71
Standard Errors in parentheses
25to which a participant belonged) has no signi…cant e¤ect on the amount sent.
Third, contrary to …ndings reported in Henrich et al. (2001) we do …nd that more
market-oriented communities exhibit lower levels of trust. Urban residence, which
correlates with market dependence has a negative but insigni…cant e¤ect on the
amount sent in the trust decision. Dependence on the market for foodsubsistence
needs signi…cantly reduces the amount sent by trustee, controlling for altruism.27
The pure altruism model of the trustee return decision predicts that the con-
stant should be zero and that the coe¢cients on the (1 ¡ ¾d
j)BT and [¾d
j + (1 ¡
¾d
j)p]BT terms should be -1 and 1, respectively (see equation 2.12). Again,
none of these predictions are supported by the data. Indeed, when …tted for
the median level of altruism (¾d
j = 0:4), the estimated regression function closely
approximates the break-even line shown in Figure 4.3. The addition of other
explanatory variables again has scant impact on the coe¢cients of the altruism
variables. Urban location is negatively and signi…cantly related to the amount
returned by trustees, though food market dependence increases amounts sent. Fi-
nally, we found that trustees decisions are not correlated with the expectation of
being reciprocated. This result is intriguing because models of reciprocity, like
Falk and Fischbacher (2000), would predict correlation between expectations and
the amount returned.28
4.4. Characterizing the Normative Environments of Communities
The literature suggests that trust and trustworthiness do not automatically oper-
ate amongst all groups of people, but that they instead must be achieved. More-
over, the bene…ts that have been attached to trust are hypothesized to occur
when trust characterizes a social grouping as opposed to being an idiosyncractic
trait. As a …rst step in our analysis of how the social capital of community norms
shapes households’ economic prospects, this section aggregates our experimental
data into community level measures of altruism, trust and reciprocity.
Table 4.1 above aggregates individuals’ decisions in the dictator game and the
trust game into community norm measures.29 The table shows the median levels
27In the post-experiment questionnaire, experimental participants were asked to score their
household’s dependence on the market for food. A score of 1 meant complete food self-
su¢ciency, and a rank of 5 indicated a complete depenence on the market for food needs.
28The logic of Falk and Fischbacher is as follows. The more a trustee thinks a trustor expects
him to return the less a trustee will judge that a trustor is being kind to him. A trustor will be
judged kind if he passes money and expect little in return.
29Strictly speaking, what we call communities are enumerator survey clusters. While all peo-
26of the di¤erent norm measures for each of the 14 communities where we carried
out experiments. Looking across these communities, we see that community
altruism as measured by the median share sent in the dictator game ranges from
25% to 50%. The correlation coe¢cient between median community altruism
and the median budget share sent by trustees is 43%, with the community median
trust shares ranging from 40% to 60%.30 Strikingly, the community median trust
share correlates very strongly with the median budget share returned by trustees
with a correlation coe¢cient of 66%. As noted earlier, trustees interested in their
private returns on funds sent to trustees would carry deeply about the percentage
returned to them by trustees, irrespective of the trustee’s motive. This strong
correlation at the community level between trustee and trustor shares suggest
that communities are in a sort of equilibrium in which expectations of returns are
matched by the actual behavior of trustees.
Finally, when we …lter out the component of trustor and trustee decisions
that can be explained by revealed altruistic preferences, we …nd that the median
level of pure trust (±
t) ranges from 0% to 13% across the 14 communities, while
reciprocity norms (±
r) that boost the amount returned by the median trustee
ranges from 4% to 33%. The cross-community correlation between these two
norm measures is 13%. The correlation between the mean community trust and
reciprocity is a more robust 35%.31 Interestingly, the 15 to 25 percentage point
variation in the median levels of these norms across our communities is as strong
as the cross-community variation in altruism. We turn now to explore the impact
of these varying normative environments of altruism, trust and reciprocity on the
capacity of households to generate an economic livelihood.
5. The Economic Value of Norms and ‘Social Capital’
Interest in the economic value of social capital—which Robert Putnam (1995:67)
de…nes as “...features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social
trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual bene…t”—has grown
ple within a cluster live close to one another, some clusters are literally tight-knit communities,
while others are socially looser neighborhoods.
30Reported corellation coe¢cients are weighted by the number of respondents in each com-
munity whose behavior de…ned the aggregate community measure.
31Close examination of the data shows that aside from two communities, there is a very strong
corellation in median trust and altruism across communities. The mean norm measures for these
communities display a pattern close to the pattern displayed by other communities.
27with the accumulating evidence that intertemporal markets are systematically
weak, missing or non-price rationed in many lowand middle income countries, and
thatthe absence ofthese markets can severely retard and distort the distributional
consequences ofeconomic growth.32 While Putnam’s andother similar de…nitions
have been criticized because they tautologically de…ne social capital in terms of
its e¤ects (e.g., see Durlauf 1999 and Portes 1998), quantitative empirical e¤orts
have had to struggle with the problem of measuring social capital separately from
its putative good e¤ects.
As described in the introduction to this paper, prior empirical e¤orts have
either relied on social associational density indicators as signals of the depth of
trust, or they have relied on surveys that ask respondents to self-report trust in
neighbors, local institutions, etc. While both these approaches su¤er from funda-
mental weaknesses, our use of economic experiments to characterize the normative
environment in di¤erent South African communities opens the door to novel mi-
croeconometric analysis of the impact of norms on the ability of individuals to
succeed materially in South Africa’s liberalized, post-apartheid economy.
5.1. Meaning and Measurement of Social Capital
While there is considerable controversy over Putnam’s and other broad de…nitions
of social capital (and indeed, over whether social capital is even a useful concept—
Bowles, 1999), a less ambitious approach is to de…ne social capital as norms that
enhance the incentive compatibility of non-contractual or legally unenforceable
exchange. Prime examples of such exchanges include time-sensitive transactions
such as informal loans and mutual insurance arrangements. In such transactions,
a good (credit or insurance) is delivered today without legal recourse should the
recipient fail to repay the loan or reciprocate with mutual aid when the need arises
in the future.
The trust game used in this study is in an analogue for legally unenforceable,
time-sensitive exchange. If we were to rewrite the …rst constraint in problem
(2.1) as:
xo = (Bt ¡ xt
s)¼; (5.1)
then the trust game would appear as a loan of amount Bt ¡ xt
s from trustor to
trustee; ¼ = 1=p > 1 would be the gross rate of return on the trustee’s investment
project; and, the return function, r(xo), would be the legally unenforceable loan
32Bannerjee and Newman (1992) and Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) are among the classic the-
oretical demonstations of this point.
28repayment from trustee to trustor. Put this way, we might indeed expect that
communities in which trust is high as revealed by our experiments, would also be
communities inwhichnorms of trust and reciprocity facilitate real non-contractual
loans and other time-sensitive exchanges that facilitate households’ ability to gen-
erate economic livelihood in the presence of imperfect markets. Moreover, as
Platteau (2000) argues, strong sharing norms akin to our altruism measure, may
actually act as a tax and diminish the ability of households to generate liveli-
hood.33
In order to investigate these propositions, we follow the basic approach sug-
gestedinNarayan andPritchett’s (1998) study ofTanzanian households. Narayan
and Pritchett regress household per-capita expenditures (as a measure of mate-
rial well-being) on a set of basic control variables (household size, location and
human capital) and on social capital variables. They measure the latter with
an index meant to capture the quantity and quality of associational life (the
number of social groups and how well they function). In order to test whether
social capital is an individual or community level phenomenon, they include both
a household-speci…c measure as well as a community average measure in their
regression speci…cation.
NarayanandPritchett’s OLSestimates showthat the community social capital
measure has a strong positive e¤ect on a household’s realized level of per-capita
expenditures. Worried about simultaneity bias (i.e., higher expenditures may
explain greater participation in groups and association, rather than vice versa),
Narayan and Pritchett employ a two-stage regression procedure in which they
instrument for their associational density social capital measure usingself-reported
trust measure.34 They …nd that even after controlling for the endogeneity of
associational life in this fashion, community level social capital continues to have
a signi…cant e¤ect on households’ material well-being.
For the analysis here, we use the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study
(KIDS) data that were collected from households in the same communities where
we undertook our economic experiments. Prior analysis of KIDS households
has shown that …nancial market constraints appear to strongly limit the ability
of households to generate a livelihood (see Carter and May, 1999), suggesting
that there is indeed space for social capital to make a di¤erence by enhancing
33It can also be that altruism will underwrite risk-taking and hence improve the investment
and livelihood climate.
34In using these instruments, argue that the norms of trust are econometrically exogenous to
any individual household’s level of well-being, an argument on which we rely in our own analysis.
29households’ ability to access credit and insurance. Indeed, two prior studies
of social capital using the KIDS data (Maluccio et al., 1999, and Haddad and
Maluccio, 2000) …nd that social capital indeed appears to signi…cantly enhance
households’ ability to generate livelihood. The …rst of these studies uses a social
association index akin to that used by Narayan and Pritchett, while the latter
study uses self-reported trust measure. For reasons discussed in the introduction,
both of these measures are problematic, and neither is likely to have isolated the
e¤ects of trust and other norms per se.
5.2. Econometric Estimates of the E¤ects of Trust in South Africa
Following the poverty and living standards literature, we use per-capita house-
hold expenditures as a measure of livelihood and material well-being. Table
5.1 displays OLS estimates of three alternative models of household living stan-
dards. The …rst of these regresses living standards on conventional, tangible
economic assets of human capital, other productive capital (land, livestock, tools
and equipment) as well as key demographic and geographic indicators. The sec-
ond speci…cation closely follows the Narayan and Pritchett (1998) and Maluccio
et al. (1999) speci…cations by adding in a community level associational den-
sity measure of social capital.35 Finally, the ‘Social Norms Model’ adds in our
experimentally-derived measures of the median level of altruism (¾d) , trust (±t)
and reciprocity (±
r) in each community. Social capital and norm measures are in-
teractedwitha rural-urban locational variable onthegrounds that entrepreneurial
and other economic opportunities are likely to be stronger in urban areas.
The ‘Tangible Assets’ model yields no particular surprises as conventional as-
sets have their expected positive returns. More interestingly, inclusion of the
median community social capital index in the ‘Associational Model’ reveals that
social capital has a positive and statistically signi…cant impact on livelihood gen-
eration in rural areas. In urban areas, the e¤ect is strongly negative. While the
potential endogeneity of the associational measure may bias this estimate (i.e.,
higher incomes cause people to join more groups), we have tried to diminish this
problem two ways. First, the measure is at the community, not the individual
level. Second, we control alsofor average living standards inthe community. Our
35John Maluccio graciously provided us with the social capital measure used in the Maluccio
et al. (2000). This measure is a household level index formed by combining information on
number of groups, gender heteorgeneity of groups, quality of group performance. The index and
is scaled to lie between 1 and 100. For the analysis here, we took the median of this measure
for each community.
30Table 5.1
OLS Estimates of the Economic Impact of Norms
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Household Per Capita Expenditure
Tangible Associational Social Norms
Assets Model Model Model
Community Norms and Social Capital
Urban-Social Capital -0.25 (0.05)** -0.61 (0.20)**
Rural-Social Capital 0.12 (0.04)** 0.05 (0.13)
Urban-Altruism (log), ¾d 1.8 (0.58)**










Education of Household Head 0.25 (0.05)** 0.27 (0.04)** 0.25 (0.04)**
Productive Assets (log) 0.07 (0.01)** 0.05 (0.01)** 0.05 (0.01)**
Demographic Characteristics
Household Size (log) -0.71 (0.07)** -0.70 (0.06)** -0.71 (0.06)**
Gender of Household Head (male=1) 0.11 (0.07) 0.09 (0.07) 0.15 (0.06)**
Age of Household Head (log) 0.72 (0.1)** 0.69 (0.14)** 0.59 (0.13)**
Community Characteristics
Avg Living Standards 0.42 (0.1)** 0.46 (0.10)** 0.34 (0.22)
Location (urban =1) 0.11 (0.1) 0.97 (0.20)** 8.1 (1.7)**
Constant 1.0 (0.8) 0.67 (0.77) -0.40 (2.6)
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.63 0.67
* Signi…cant at the 10% level
** Signi…cant at the 5% level
31estimates are in line with those obtained in prior studies, which have had data
structures that permit more ambitious control for the endogeneity of associational
density measures of social capital.36
Finally, turning to the ‘Social Norms Model,’ we see several striking results.
First, the norm measures appear largely to capture an in‡uence on household
living standards that is distinct from the in‡uence of the associational density
measure.37 Second, the urban and rural impacts of norms are quite distinct. Al-
truism, trust and reciprocity norms have large andstatistically signi…cant positive
impacts on urban livelihood generation. The estimated coe¢cients can be inter-
preted as elasticities, implying, for example, that a 10% increase in the reciprocity
norm measure boosts the per-capita expenditure measure of permanent income
by 7%. In contrast, altruism and trust are estimated to signi…cantly reduce rural
livelihood generation. While we might have expected the magnitude of these
e¤ects to di¤er between urban and rural areas based on the di¤erent opportunity
sets available in these regions, this sign reversal is puzzling.
Two non-mutually exclusive explanations for these distinctive rural versus ur-
ban results present themselves. First, high levels of normative commitment may
represent something di¤erent in rural areas. In many of the rural areas studied
here, a hierarchical chieftaincy structure dominates local a¤airs. The presence of
strong norms in these areas may signal the strength of the customary forces of
‘excess sharing’ that Platteau suggests may suppress individual incentives, initia-
tive and incomes. Second, the types of social capital and connections that can be
accessed in urban areas may be fundamentally distinct from those in rural areas.
In particular, strong norms of trust and reciprocity in urban areas may permit
households to tap into what some social capital literature calls ‘bridging social
capital,’ meaning relationships that extend across class and ethnic groups. In
contrast, the only connections in rural areas that can be utilized via relationships
of trust, etc. may be what this literature calls ‘bounded social capital,’ meaning
highly localized ties based on family and other close relationships.
36When included in the regression, the individual social capital measures are positive and sta-
tistically signi…cant in both urban and rural areas. Results for the community level measures
are not a¤ected by the inclusion of the individual measures. This pattern of coe¢cients, includ-
ing the negative impact of community social capital on urban livelihood generation, matches
results reported in Maluccio et al. (2000).
37The bivariate corellations between associational social capital measure and our experimen-
tally derived norm measures are weak.
326. Conclusions
Empirical analysis of the economic signi…cance of trust and reciprocity has been
hampered by the di¢culty of measuring these norms. Consistent with the sug-
gestions of Camerer and Fehr (2001) and Carpenter (2001), this paper has turned
to experimental methods to solve this measurement problem. However, we have
argued that to measure trust and reciprocity with experimental methods, we …rst
need to know how much people intrinsically care for others. We have thus uti-
lized a multi-stage experimental design that permits us to form intra-personal
comparison measures that allow us to distinguish trust and reciprocity from al-
truistic caring for others. Applicationof this experimental design in a set of South
African communities reveals that altruism, trust and reciprocity are distinguish-
able and that the proposed measures are sensible in that they reveal a normative
consistency at both the level of individuals and communities.
In taking experimental methods out of the lab and into the …eld presents a
numberofproblemsandlimitations. Our measures oftrust andreciprocity purged
of altruism have depended on speci…c assumptions about the structure of utility
functions. While this structure can in principle be estimated (as Andreoni and
Miller, 2002 demonstrate), the challenge of experimentation in the …eld makes
this more di¢cult. But, in taking this design outside the laboratory, we have
also probed the usefulness of experimental methods to inform ongoing debates
about the ability of social capital and relations of trust to substitute for imperfect
markets in poor communities. Taking advantage of a recently conducted living
standards survey conducted in the communities where we carried out our experi-
ments, we were able to explore the impact of norms on the ability of households
to generate livelihoods.
Several striking results emerge from this analysis. First, in contrast to the
suggestion of Henrich et al. (2001), we do not …nd that altruistic and trusting be-
havior increase monotonically with market integration and dependence. Altruism
is on average higher in rural areas. Trust controlling for altruism is una¤ected
by urban residence, and decreases with market integration (as measured by de-
pendence on the market for subsistence needs).
Second, we do …nd that these norms show large positive payo¤s in urban envi-
ronments where presumably opportunities are greater, or perhaps where norms of
trust permits people to link up and bridge with others who can broker opportuni-
ties in other sectors of the economy. Third, we …nd, somewhat surprisingly, that
high levels of altruism and trust depress livelihood generation in rural communi-
33ties. This latter result is at least broadly consistent with Platteau’s observation
that the high levels of sharing expectedand realized in some rural African commu-
nities may negatively impact on incentives and incomes. Finally, we …ndevidence
that our experimentally derived measures of trust and norms are at best weakly
related to the associational density measures of social capital that have often been
used in the literature. This …nding, together with the provocative …ndings on
the economics of norms, motivates further use of experimental methods to explore
questions of social capital. By learning to measure trust and related concepts
more clearly, we can begin to make better progress on understanding the deter-
minants of trust and ultimately understand the factors that shape access to social
capital.38
38If access to the social capital of trust is strati…ed by class, linguisitic group or ethnicity,
then social capital may work poorly as an avenue of upward mobility in ‘corellated societies’
such as South Africa in which economic status and ethnic identity are strongly related (see
Figueroa, 2001). In this case, what Stewart (2001) calls horizontal inequality (inequalities
between culturally formed gropus) will tend to perpetuate conventional economic (vertical)
inequality.
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